While still in his early twenties Mr Holdich had deposited sperm samples in a cryogenic storage facility prior to receiving treatment for testicular cancer. He recovered from the cancer, but the treatment left him infertile. When nearly a decade later he sought to retrieve the samples in order that he and his wife could attempt to conceive a child by in vitro fertilisation he was advised of the possibility that a malfunction in the storage vessel had damaged the samples and that they were unsafe to use. In consequence, the couple did not proceed with IVF. Mr Holdich raised an action against the Health Board as provider of the storage facility, claiming compensation for distress, depression and loss of the chance of fatherhood. His claim was presented primarily as one for mental injury consequential on property damage in breach of contract. Et separatim, he argued that he had suffered 'pure' mental injury for which delictual damages were due, or alternatively that the damage to the samples gave rise to a 'sui generis' type of claim based upon common-law fault for which damages were payable.
2 damage to the samples was neither damage to the claimants' property, nor was it a personal injury. The claim was rejected at first instance but upheld in the Court of Appeal. The main basis for the latter decision was that the claimants were to be regarded as the owners of the samples, 3 and therefore compensation could be claimed for the destruction of the material in the defendants' storage facility in breach of bailment. It was not therefore necessary to give extended scrutiny to the claimants' arguments drawn from the law of tort. Following on from this decision, the parties in Holdich appeared to have concentrated upon the property-law, rather than the delictual, aspects of their case. Lord Stewart took the view that, while bailment was not a contract as such, and therefore not directly comparable with the Scots contract of deposit, the availability of this remedy in English law was 'at least mildly persuasive' in the question of whether the property-contract case should be allowed to go to proof. Moreover, since the delictual case was to be permitted to proceed there was 'an argument in expediency' in the property-contract case going forward also, but he signalled that he found the latter more persuasive than the former. 4 Detailed examination elsewhere of the property arguments suggests that these present a convincing basis for taking proceedings forward. 5 Following on from this, the next section will assess the case for imposing delictual liability in relation to psychiatric injury deriving from damage to the sperm when regarded as the patient's property. At the same time, this chapter will point to the problems inherent in presenting the loss suffered as a personal injury (a possibility put forward by Lord Stewart), or as an invasion of the patient's autonomy.
B. PSYCHIATRIC INJURY DERIVING FROM DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
The plaintiffs in Yearworth had argued that if they were regarded as owners of the samples, they were entitled to compensation for psychiatric injury triggered by learning of their destruction. The authority relied upon was Attia v British Gas plc, in which the Court of Appeal refused to strike out a claim for the shock suffered by the plaintiff on witnessing her 
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house burn down as a result of negligence by central heating engineers. 6 The Court of Appeal in Yearworth did not venture a final judgment on this point, since a remedy would lie in any event for breach of bailment. However, it cast doubt on the relevance of Attia, noting that the Yearworth claimants had been informed at second hand of the spoiling of the samples but, unlike Mrs Attia at the fire scene, had not witnessed it themselves. Although this distinction was 'controversial', the court seemed to regard it as valid because it 'replicated' that which was 'drawn in relation to the so-called secondary victim who foreseeably suffers psychiatric injury as a result of personal injury which the primary victim suffers…as a result of the defendant's negligence'. The discussion so far has assumed the pursuer's ownership of the samples. If, however, it were ultimately to be determined that the pursuer did not own them (and that the physical damage to them did not constitute personal injury to Mr Holdich 13 ), it is difficult to see how duty might be established in relation to a claim for 'pure' psychiatric injury. Perhaps rather surprisingly, Lord Stewart indicated that authority of sorts might be drawn from
Goorkani v Tayside Health Board, 14 but the circumstances of that case were not directly comparable. In Goorkani, the pursuer had become infertile after treatment for an eye condition. Infertility was a known side-effect of the particular drug prescribed to him and there was no allegation of negligence in the way that treatment had been administered; nor was it established that the pursuer would not have gone ahead with the treatment had he known of the risk. Instead, the pursuer claimed, and the court accepted, that the doctor failed to exercise due care in providing information about the treatment, so that, some time after the treatment, the patient experienced shock and anger on discovering the reason why he and his wife had not conceived a child. In other words the negligence in that case lay not in any act which caused infertility but in the mode of communicating, or failing to communicate, the likelihood of infertility. Unlike Holdich, therefore, Goorkani could not fairly be said to be a case of 'negligently caused sterility'. To the extent that there is an 'impairment' here, it is not to the pursuer's person as such but to his future prospects of procreation. However, it is by no means obvious that the case for compensation can be more cogently argued in relation to injury characterised as loss of reproductive autonomy.
D. LOSS OF AUTONOMY AS INFRINGEMENT OF A PERSONALITY RIGHT?
In Holdich the claim based upon loss of autonomy was permitted to go forward to proof, on the basis that autonomy in this context 'seemed' to be a 'personality right'. 25 Lord Stewart was not, however, entirely persuaded that it would succeed as thus framed. In particular he expressed concern that there was little authority to support loss of autonomy as an independent head of damages. But while it is no doubt correct that the law of negligence has in the past normally protected autonomy only as ancillary to other forms of harm, this is by no means the first time that the question of appropriate recognition for loss of autonomy has come to the fore. expectation of a negative response was conclusive. 40 A common thread running through the speeches, however, was concern for the dignity of the unborn child if a value were to be placed upon her non-existence, and the disproportionality of the full costs of maintaining the child in relation to the defenders' negligence. As it happens, their Lordships made extensive reference to an article written by Lord Stewart while he was still at the Bar, 41 providing a comparative survey of case law on damages for the birth of a child. The article concluded that wrongful birth/pregnancy cases in reality comprised 'two claims-one for personal injury and one for economic loss', although this had hitherto been 'but dimly perceived by the courts'.
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It also argued for application of the 'limited damages' rule as found in certain US states, whereby damages might be awarded for the discomfort suffered in pregnancy and childbirth, but not for the costs of maintaining the child. Taking up these suggestions, the House of damnum occurred at conception, two separate claims were presented by this case. 43 The first, concerning the physical consequences of conception in terms of the pain of childbirth, was allowable; the second, concerning the economic consequences of conception in terms of child maintenance costs, was classified as pure economic loss and therefore rejected. 44 
b) After McFarlane
The reasoning applied in McFarlane has been subjected to detailed critique elsewhere, 46 and
will not be considered further here. It was not 'easy to assign to the traditional categories of duty, breach and damage, given that all agreed that there was some duty in the case and that, if that duty had been broken, some recoverable damage had resulted.' 47 Nonetheless,
McFarlane remains the leading authority in wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth cases, 43 Although Lord Clyde pointed out at 33-34 that 'Once the obligation to make reparation for some loss is predicated, it seems to me difficult to analyse the claim for maintenance of the child as a particular, and so separate, obligation.' However, he too rejected the maintenance cost element of the McFarlanes' claim as exceeding the requirement for reasonable restitution (at 37). Appeal denied recovery of the basic costs of maintenance that would also have applied in relation to a healthy child, but nonetheless awarded compensation for the extra costs of providing for the child's special needs deriving from the disability. This was said to be justified by 'distributive justice', and because 'ordinary people would consider that it would be fair for the law to make an award in such a case, provided that it is limited to the extra expenses associated with the child's disability'. 49 In effect, therefore, reference to imagined popular consensus justified further modification of traditional principle, not only to partition the claims relating to the non-patrimonial and patrimonial elements, but also to subdivide the latter.
McFarlane has never been overruled, and the costs of maintaining a healthy child 
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negligent advice on the effect of such a procedure, is the victim of a legal wrong', 51 and that the 'real loss suffered' was where 'a parent, particularly (even today) the mother, has been denied, through the negligence of another, the opportunity to live her life in the way that she recognition is consistent with the modern development of protection for personality rights.
c) Reproductive autonomy as an aspect of protection for liberty
For obvious reasons, protection for autonomy in this sense has not hitherto figured in traditional accounts, but it can be accommodated without distortion in the law of delict's fundamental rights-based framework. As is well-known, the personality rights enjoyed by the individual, infringement of which triggers delictual liability, are the right to life, limb and health, liberty, fame, reputation and honour. 62 That listing of personality rights has its origins in Institutional writings 63 and has in its essentials been replicated many times over the years in Scots, 64 and indeed comparative, 65 sources. But nothing, of course, remains entirely the fama and dignitas has progressively required adjustment. 68 Thus the absence of discussion of autonomy from traditional accounts of the law of delict, and from more modern listings of the personality rights thereby protected, does not necessarily preclude its recognition.
The suppression of informed choice in regard to conception or the continuation of pregnancy cannot readily be bracketed with the right to physical integrity as traditionally conceptualised. 69 Frustration of the option not to have a child does not easily square with infliction of physical injury or disease, 70 nor with cases of physical constraint on movement.
At the same time, it is argued that personal liberty must now be regarded as extending beyond the straightforward 'right to free motion and locomotion' 71 a right is at stake in issues of access to assisted reproduction. Many variables will affect the viability of that process, and, even assuming that it goes ahead to plan, the success rate for couples in their early 30s is still well short of 50%. 81 It is therefore problematic to cast the rights of patients for whom sperm samples have been stored in terms of an absolute entitlement; there can be no unqualified 'right' to make a baby, nor even to gain access to assisted reproduction.
Even if the spoilage of the samples is somehow recognised as infringing a personality right, questions of causation arise, as briefly noted in Yearworth and in Holdich. 82 In cases of wrongful pregnancy or wrongful birth the litigants can argue that, but for the defenders' negligence, they would have exercised their choice not to conceive or not to continue a problem pregnancy, and in most cases there is likely to have been no impediment to that choice being fulfilled; in other words, there is a direct causal link between the iniuria (the doctor's negligence), and the damnum (conception, or birth of the damaged child). Where sperm samples have been spoiled, the pursuer might argue that the iniuria was constituted by the defenders' negligent storage of the samples. He might also argue that loss of potential for 79 It must be conceded, however, that the commentary gives little detail on why the aspiration to preserve the possibility of procreation is considered to be an 'interest worthy of legal protection' as an aspect of patient autonomy, aside from the rather bland assertion that category (iii) 'makes space' for the further development of the law. 80 The formulation in the DCFR is perhaps influenced by the wording of the German Civil Code § 823 in providing for injury to 'injures the life, body, health, freedom, property or another right'. 84 At best the loss suffered is the loss of an opportunity, and it is doubtful whether the pursuer could show that he would have had more than a 50% chance of fathering a child had the samples not been spoiled by the defenders'
negligence. It is difficult to see therefore how the pursuer could circumvent the wellestablished rule that the lost opportunity of a favourable medical outcome is generally only actionable if the pursuer can show that, but for the defender's negligence, there had been at least a 50% chance of a favourable outcome.
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E. CONCLUSION
The possible grounds for a delictual claim against the operators of the storage facility present varying degrees of difficulty. If the samples are found to have been owned by Mr Holdich, and if he can establish that he suffered psychiatric injury as a result of their spoilage, a strong argument can be made for compensation. The restrictions which limit recovery for such injury in the case of 'secondary' victims have no relevance to a claim framed in this way. On the other hand, there is no obvious answer to the serious objections made against characterising damage to the samples as a personal injury in itself. Similarly, while the traditional framework of delictual protection for personality rights must now be regarded as capable of accommodating the right to patient autonomy, and even reproductive autonomy, as a further dimension of bodily integrity, the spoiling of the opportunity to use a sperm sample in IVF cannot readily be classified in equivalent terms. 
